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Abstract.  This paper develops a model to study corporate investment decisions using the 
principal-agent framework.  The model has asymmetric information where the agent knows the 
true value of the company and the principal does not.  The model also has uncertainty where 
the company is presented an investment opportunity with a certain cost and random benefit.  
The agent must decide whether they will sell stock to the principal and make the investment.  
Results show that the information asymmetry imposes a cost on the principal because the 
agent will forgo some profitable projects or undertake some with expected losses.  A procedure 
for the principal to distinguish undervalued and overvalued companies is presented. 
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1. Introduction 
The relationship between information and incentives in context of corporate decision making is 
complex.  It is possible to explore this complexity using the Principal-Agent model.  In an 
important paper, Myers and Majluf (1984) showed there is an adverse selection problem in 
corporate investments due to asymmetric information.  My research extends this result to 
include uncertainty and shows a rich new set of results. 
 
This paper will start by reviewing the Myers and Majluf (1984) paper, henceforth called MM.  
Using simplified notation, I will show that the information asymmetry imposes a cost on the 
principal where the principal overpays for all investments.  Keeping this notation, I will show 
that it is convenient to build uncertainty into the model by setting the benefit of the investment 
as a random variable.  In the model with randomness, if there is no information asymmetry 
then the agent will invest in all projects with positive Net Present Value (NPV).  With 
asymmetry, the agent may forgo positive NPV projects or undertake negative ones, both of 
which impose a cost on the principal.  To mitigate these problems, I will show how the principal 
can distinguish some agents who value their company higher than the principal. 
 
The type of information asymmetry in this model is hidden type, where the agent knows the 
true value of the company and the principal does not.  This is a canonical framework and it is 
useful for analyzing corporate investment decisions.  The agent decides when a corporation 
invests, yet it must raise capital from a principal; therefore, any difference of opinions between 
principal and agent may be an important driver in the agent's decision.  The model starts with 
the agent owning all of the company.  The agent represents management, or current owners, 
and an opportunity to invest in a new project is presented to the agent.  In MM, the cost ( ) 
and benefit ( ) of the investment are certain and public information, whereas the benefit (B) is 
a random variable in my model.  Therefore, my model has to propose a new decision making 
criteria that allows the agent to deal with randomness.   
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In order to make the investment, the agent must sell stock to the principal.  In MM, the 
principal has bargaining power and the amount of stock that the principal receives is related to 
the benefit of the project.  My model has to adjust this contract to deal with uncertainty, which 
can be done in two ways.  One way gives the same results as MM, whereas another more 
realistic contract gives a new set of results.  It is important to consider both of these contracts 
because they can be used to distinguish agents who are being overvalued by the principal from 
those who are undervalued. 
 
 
2. Analysis 
The following are the main technical sections of the paper. First, I present notation and review 
the MM model.  I show that asymmetric information causes  an adverse selection problem and 
this imposes a cost on the principal relative to perfect information.  In the second section, I 
show how uncertainty can be included in the MM model using similar notation and 
assumptions.  I show that the agent invests in all positive NPV projects when there is no 
asymmetric information, however, asymmetric information will impose a cost on the principal 
in one of several ways.  The type of the cost depends on the parameter values, which I explore 
in detail.  In the third section, I show how the principal can use two different types of contracts 
to distinguish different types of agents and mitigate the costs of asymmetric information. 
 
 
2.1 Review of the MM model 
The MM paper has made a large impact on research in corporate finance (Klein, O'Brien, Peters 
2002).  The paper has led to the 'pecking order' theory of capital structure, based on the way 
different securities effect information asymmetry.  Further, the paper is actually increasing in 
popularity.  Although other influential scholars have addressed the same issues as MM – see 
Fama (1980) or Jensen and Meckling (1976) – they have not had the same lasting impact.  The 
average number of times that MM was cited per year was fifty from 1990-1995.  However, from 
2009-2011, the average number of citations has grown to approximately 160 (Thomson Reuters 
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2012).  Despite this large amount of activity, it is not clear that anyone has extended the MM 
model to deal with uncertainty. 
  
The MM paper considers a company that has value    known to the agent.  Although it is a big 
assumption to say a company has a 'true' value, it is essential for the model.  The principal 
believes the value of the company to be   , which is calculated as an expectation in MM.  The 
investment opportunity has cost C and benefit B, which are certain and public information in 
MM.  After investment occurs, the true value of the company is defined as      and the 
principal believes it is     .  The MM paper assumes    , which means the project has 
positive NPV and the value of the company increases after investment. 
 
The agent decides whether to sell stock to the principal and make the investment.  Here, the 
MM paper makes a strong assumption.  Since the principal knows  , MM assume that the agent 
will give sufficient stock that the principal receives all of the benefits of the investment.  This 
assumption can be justified as the theoretical solution to the 'ultimatum game'.  Since 1984 we 
have learned a lot about behavioural biases which show that this theoretical solution is very 
impractical (Bearden 2001).  Therefore, this is a contentious assumption.  Formally, the amount 
of stock which the principal receives is equal to     
 
    
.  This represents the value of the 
principal's contribution ( ) divided by the value of the company after the investment (    ). 
 
To decide whether to invest, the agent compares utility before and after the investment.  The 
MM paper uses a linear utility function, which means the decision is based on profit 
maximization.  The agent's value before the investment is   , and value after is        .  
The decision criteria involves the change in ownership (agent owns fraction     after 
investment) and the increase in value (true value becomes      after investment) of the 
company.  The adverse selection result is derived in the appendix by combining the decision 
criteria and the amount of stock which the principal receives.  Equation (1) states the result: 
  
 (1)  Invest if       
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To see the cost of asymmetric information in the MM model, consider the case of perfect 
information.  By definition, the principal and agent will both know the true value of the 
company and so Equation (1) will always be satisfied; agents will invest in all projects.  Further, 
the amount of stock the principal will receive will be different in perfect information.  The 
amount of stock exchanged will become the 'fair' amount based on the true value of the 
company: 
  
    
.  In the appendix, I show that the agent keeps a larger part of the company 
under asymmetric information.  Therefore, the cost to the principal of asymmetric information 
can be seen as 'overpaying' for stock, or receiving less stock than they should based on their 
contribution. 
 
 
2.2 Model with uncertainty 
The new model that I propose will keep the information asymmetry of MM, where the agent 
knows the true value    and the principal knows an estimate   .  The cost   will still be certain 
and public, however, the benefit   will be uncertain when the agent decides to invest.  The 
timing is as follows: first, the agent and principal form their valuations; second, the agent 
decides whether to issue stock or not to the principal; third, if investment occurs then the value 
  is revealed.  Although the timing of my model is based on MM, I need to adapt the agent's 
decision making criteria and the amount of shares that are exchanged to the case of 
uncertainty. 
 
To extend the agent's decision making criteria, I propose a linear expected utility function.  That 
is,              where   is a random variable,     denotes the linear utility function, and 
    the expectation of  .  This means that the agent attempts to maximize expected profit 
when choosing whether to invest.  As in MM, the agent compares the utility before and after 
the investment.  For this utility function, the agent will use the following condition: 
 
 (2)  Invest if               
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In Equation (2), the only random term is  .  This is because   has to be set when the 
investment occurs, before   is revealed.  As in MM,   is the fraction of the company which the 
agent owns after the investment.  The principal receives     for providing the cost   of the 
project.  The contract     needs to be revised to reflect uncertainty.  The numerator of     
will be the value which the principal provides to the company after investment, whereas the 
denominator will be the total value of the company after investment. 
 
One possible contract is     
    
       
.  This is a 'mark to model' approach because the 
contract is set using the expected benefit, which is the output of some model.   
This contract gives the same results as MM because it only differs by a change of notation 
(replace   with     ).  The second case is     
 
    
, which is a cost based approach.  For 
the intuition of this contract, consider how the value of the company is set in the time between 
the investment is approved and the benefit is revealed; the value of the company increases by 
the amount of money that is spent.  This approach could be described by the expression 'don't 
count your chickens before the hatch'.  This second case will be the focus of my attention: 
 
 (3)   
  
    
 
  
With the decision making criteria, Equation (2), and the contract, Equation (3), it is possible to 
derive the solution for this problem.  The solution determines when the agent will invest, based 
solely on variables that are known at the time of the decision.  This solution is Equation (4): 
 
 (4) 
  
  
 
    
 
 
 
In words, Equation (4) compares the amount by which the company is undervalued (if 
  
  
   
then the company is undervalued) to the profitability of the project (if 
    
 
   then the project 
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has positive NPV).  The condition states that all but the most undervalued companies will take a 
given project.  Alternatively, it says that a company will only invest in the best projects 
available.  In the next section, I will make these statements precise and show the cost imposed 
on the principal by information asymmetry. 
 
 
2.3 Results 
Using Equation (4), it is possible to consider a given project and compare what type of 
companies would invest in it.  It is also possible to consider a specific company and compare 
what type of projects it would invest in.  Each type of analysis can be represented graphically.  
However, the most important analysis of the results is based on whether a project has positive 
or negative NPV, and whether the company is overvalued or undervalued. 
 
First, I present the case with no information asymmetry.  As in MM, this means the agent and 
principal both know the true value of the company before investment (     ).  Imposing this 
onto Equation (4) gives a familiar decision rule: invest in all projects with positive NPV.  In 
simple terms, the NPV for a project is equal to the benefit minus the cost.  It is reassuring that 
this new model gives this familiar result, which will be the benchmark for calculating the costs 
of information asymmetry.  The positive-NPV decision rule is written as: 
 
 (5)  Invest if        
 
To explore the effects of asymmetric information, I will discuss a given company.  Let   
  
  
 
then     means the company is undervalued, whereas     means the company is 
overvalued by the principal.  An undervalued company will not invest in all positive NPV 
projects: all investments with   
    
 
    will not be made.  This imposes a cost on the 
principal relative to the benchmark case with no information asymmetry.  Next, an overvalued 
company will invest in all positive NPV projects and even some negative NPV projects!  This 
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occurs because   
    
 
   means that some projects with negative NPV will be approved.  
This imposes a different type of cost on the principal relative to perfect information.  In either 
case, the principal is worse off under asymmetric information than perfect information. 
 
In the case where    , the company is perfectly valued and the agent will invest in all positive 
NPV projects.  In this case, the information asymmetry has no effect and the outcome is the 
same as perfect information.  Intuitively, this shows that there is an incentive for the principal 
to study the agent's business closely to best estimate the value and minimize agency costs. 
 
 
Figure 1 shows how a given company will evaluate all possible projects.  The figure uses an 
arbitrary positive value for   
  
  
 to show that there will always be some projects that the 
agent will accept and others they will reject.  Naturally, the accept region is filled with projects 
that have the highest expected benefit.  The line that is shown in Figure 1 is the indifference 
curve, where the agent’s decision criterion is binding.  Technically, this line is part of the 
acceptance region described above.   Note that it may be possible to augment Figure 1 to show 
the costs of information asymmetry graphically, since the cost imposed by asymmetric 
information is related to the difference of   for a particular company and    . 
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As mentioned before, it is also possible to look at   
    
 
 as a given project and see who will 
invest.  Based on Equation (4), only the companies which are the most overvalued will invest 
(
  
  
  ).  This means the principal is consistently making the worst investments possible and 
missing out on opportunities with undervalued firms, who represent the best bargains.  This is 
another way to see the cost imposed on the principal by information asymmetry. 
 
 
2.4 Use of contracts to separate agents 
In the simple logic of this model, it is possible that the agent can distinguish between 
overvalued and (some) undervalued companies.  This can be done using the two contracts 
discussed in Section 2.2.  Recall contract one:    
  
       
, where the agent will invest if the 
company is overvalued,      .  Contract two is:    
  
    
, where the agent will invest if 
   
    
 
  .  Suppose that you are the principal and you have a positive NPV project 
  
    
 
  .  There are a list of agents who you could partner with and you want to narrow the 
list down.  The results of this model can help you make that decision. 
 
First, the principal should offer contract one to all available firms and identify those who reject.  
Second, offer contract two to all firms and identify those who accept.  Any firm who rejects 
contract one and accepts contract two is one that the principal should do business with.  This is 
because these firms exist in the region where          , which says the company is 
undervalued by the principal but not so undervalued that they will reject the project.  In this 
way, the principal can avoid making investments in overvalued firms and identify undervalued 
firms that will accept the investment opportunity.  This is a compelling result and I will provide 
a graphical explanation below.  
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Whereas Figure 1 showed which projects a given company would approve, Figure 2 shows 
which companies will approve a given project.  The region where an agent will accept an 
investment is where the principal’s value for the company is sufficiently high.  This is why the 
acceptance region is on lower side of the indifference line, unlike in Figure 1.   
 
In Figure 2, Region 1 is the set of companies that would accept contract one (  ).  This region is 
all points below the line      .  All of the companies in Region 1 are overvalued.  Region 2 is 
the set of companies that would accept contract two (  ), only some of these companies are 
overvalued.  Since the edge of Region 1 is the set of companies that are perfectly valued, the 
companies in Region 2 and not Region 1 are the ones that are undervalued and would approve 
your investment opportunity under contract two.  Note that it is not hard to find an 
undervalued firm in this model, the real challenge is finding an undervalued firm that will 
accept your investment opportunity.   
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3. Conclusion 
This paper shows that uncertainty can be included in a model of asymmetric information to 
deepen our understanding of corporate investment decisions.  The model shows that a 
company will issue stock to pursue negative NPV projects if it is sufficiently overvalued, or it will 
pass on some positive NPV projects if it is undervalued by the principal.  In either case, 
asymmetric information imposes a cost on the principal.  This paper also shows that the 
principal can use two contracts to separate types of agents.  It is possible to avoid all 
overvalued firms and identify the firms who are undervalued, but still willing to approve a given 
investment opportunity.   
 
There are several ways to extend this analysis further.  The normative recommendations in 
Section 2.4 could be studied more closely and made operational for a sophisticated investor.  
Or an interested researcher could revise Section 2.2 and allow the initial value of the company 
to be uncertain.  Then, the investment could be viewed as an addition to the value of the 
company, or as an investment that improves the agent’s knowledge about the value of the 
company.  These models would use Bayesian game theory and may be relevant to decision 
making for mineral exploration businesses.  In fact, I would very much like to discuss the 
relevance of this model with business executives involved in mineral exploration.  I would like 
to explore if there is potential for software to support decision making based on the models 
presented here. 
 
The myriad events that occur in the world of corporate investments can be difficult to reconcile 
with a basic model of adverse selection.  The results of this paper show that surprising 
behaviour can appear when uncertainty is present.  It is my hope that the surprising behaviour I 
have found can be useful to better understand the events that occur in our world today. 
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Technical Appendix: 
 
Result 1: 
Assume   
  
    
, then                          
 
    
 
  
    
     
  .  This shows that there is an adverse selection problem in the MM model.   
 
Result 2: 
Assume      , then 
  
    
  
  
    
                          .  This shows 
that adverse selection problem in the MM model causes the principal to receive less stock in 
the company than they would under perfect information. 
 
Result 3: 
Assume   
  
    
, then                                
 
    
 
  
    
     
  
  
 
    
 
.  This shows the decision criteria for the model with uncertainty. 
 
 
 
